This paper follows up on recent studies of the Eurozone interest rate pass-through. Using a generalized empirical approach that allows for a variety of different specifications of the pass-through, including asymmetric adjustment, the role of interest rate expectations, proxied by EURIBOR futures, in determining retail banking product pricing is explored. It is shown that the pass-through is faster when monetary policy changes are correctly anticipated. However, this result is limited to the loan market and here more pronounced for positive interest rate shocks, while particularly deposit rate are found to be rigid, suggesting an important role of competitive banking markets for the pass-through process. Overall, our results show that a well-communicated monetary policy is important for a speedier and a more homogenous passthrough and thus for a more effective monetary policy in the Eurozone. JEL Classification Numbers: E43, E52, E58, F36
1. Introduction
Investigating the pass-through of monetary policy impulses onto retail banking interest rates has become an important part of the research on the financial part of the monetary transmission process in the Eurozone. The results have direct implications for assessing the efficiency of the monetary policy, the heterogeneity (or a possible trend towards homogeneity) of the Eurozone financial system, and the competitive situation in different segments of the banking markets. While the literature is fairly well developed by now, the complete absence of interest rate expectations and monetary policy anticipation from the literature is striking. In the presence of forward looking financial markets, and in particular the existence of interest rate futures, such as EURIBOR futures, which may act as a measure of expected future interest rates, pricing behaviour in retail banking is likely to be forward looking too. The present study will explore this issue by disentangling the impact of expected and unexpected monetary policy impulses and discuss the impact of a well-communicated monetary policy on the Eurozone interest rate pass-through.
Following the pioneering pass-through study by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) who are applying a VAR model in an international context, this approached has soon been adopted within the European context (Cottarelli, Ferri, and Generale 1995 , BIS 1994 , Borio and Fritz 1995 . Following Sander and Kleimeier (2000) pass-through studies are now regularly based on an error-correction specification (e.g. Mojon 2000 , Heinemann and Schüler 2001 , Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan 2002 . Most recently, asymmetric adjustment of retail bank rates to monetary impulses has also been considered. This until now relatively small literature (see e.g. Sander and Kleimeier 2000 , 2002 , de Bondt 2002 , and de Bondt, Mojon, and Valla 2002 builds on Tong (1983) , structural breaks, and introduces an automatic model selection out of a vast variety of possible pass-through models allowing for asymmetric and threshold adjustment. Doing so, we find that breakpoints are typically occurring some years before monetary union has commenced, thus pointing to the important role of forward looking behaviour in financial markets. Comparing then pre-and post-break pass-through behaviour, we confirm the results of previous studies that report stickiness of short-run adjustment of retail interest rates in the Eurozone. Nevertheless an increased speed of the pass-through in the post-break period is confirmed. Moreover, we find a large number of banking markets with a less than perfect long-run pass-through. This suggests that market imperfections such as credit rationing may have remained an important feature in European retail banking. The view that Eurozone banking markets are still fragmented is supported, with the eventual exemption of short-term lending to enterprises. Finally, analysing the determinants of the pass-through we find that competition, banking market integration, a stable monetary policy regime, or a more homogeneous growth performance are all important variables for homogenizing the pass-through and thus monetary transmission in the Eurozone while legal and cultural differences may, however, preclude full convergence.
In this paper we follow-up on our synthesis paper by introducing a distinction between expected and unexpected monetary policy changes. As financial markets are forward looking, it can be argued that changes in policy rate may already be priced into retail banking interest rates well before the actual changes in the monetary policy occur.
For example, in the context of the US mortgage market Sellon (2002) has argued that in the recent years "both mortgage rate and market interest rate appear to anticipate 4 monetary policy actions", i.e. they rose somewhat before episodes of monetary tightening and fell well before decreases in fed funds target rates. Consequently, if retail interest rates anticipate changes in monetary policy rates, the measured impact and intermediate multipliers may not convey a correct picture of the pass-through process. A related issue is the impact of correct anticipation of the ECB's policy actions on the speed of the passthrough process, thus pointing to the role of a frictionless communication between the central bank and the market. Moreover, the irregular pattern of asymmetries across countries and banking products found in previous studies may reflect a differential behaviour with respect to expected and unexpected shocks. By differentiating between both we want to shed some more light on the stickiness of bank product prices. Finally, it could be argued that with a single monetary policy the anticipation of monetary policy action will also become more uniform across the Eurozone and thus contribute to a more homogenous pass-through.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce our measurement of expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks by making use of EURIBOR futures to measure expected interest rates -which is novel in the pass-through literature. In section 3 we briefly describe our methodology. Section 4 reports the results of our analysis and section 5 concludes with a view on improving the pass-through process in the Eurozone.
Data
In order to differentiate between expected and unexpected shocks we follow Kuttner (2001) who -in the US context -has made use of the Fed Funds Future Market as an indicator for anticipated monetary policy rate. Unfortunately, in the Eurozone no 5 futures on ECB policy rates are available. However, Bernoth and von Hagen (2003) analyse 3-months EURIBOR futures and conclude that these rates are unbiased and efficient predictors of future spot interest rates. These authors also assert that "market participants understand the policy decisions of the Central Bank and on average are able to predict them precisely. Nevertheless some Governing Council decisions still cause leading market participants to revise their interest rate forecasts. Thus the ECB's information policy can be improved." Consequently, we make a differentiation between expected and unexpected monetary policy impulses such that Figure 1 shows the time series graphs of all three series.
As the comparison between MPE and MP shows, futures rates follow very closely the realised monetary policy rates. As such MPU, the unexpected component of the monetary policy impulses, centres around zero. Unit root tests confirm this random nature of MPU 1 Eurex establishes the final settlement price at 11:00 a.m. CET on the last trading day (LTD), based on the reference rate (EURIBOR) for one-month euro time deposits established by the FBE/ACI. To fix the final settlement price, the EURIBOR rate is rounded to the nearest price interval (0.005; 0.01; or a multiple thereof), and is then subtracted from 100. The LTD is two exchange trading days prior to the third Wednesday of the respective settlement month -provided that on that day the FBE/ACI has determined the reference interest rate EURIBOR pertaining to one-month euro time deposits; otherwise, the preceding day. Contrary to regular trading hours, trading in the settling contract ceases at 11:00 a.m. CET.
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as it is found to be I(0). On the other hand, both MP and MPE are I(1 
Methodology
We are following here the methodology developed by Sander and Kleimeier (2002), which we briefly introduce in the following. 6 As a starting point we use the "standard pass-through model" which is a simple VAR model used by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) ,
where BR t and MP t are bank and policy rates. The optimal lag length is indicated by k* and n*, respectively. The impact multiplier is estimates by the coefficient β 1 , where a value of less than 1 indicates sluggish adjustment, also known as lending rate stickiness.
The long-term multiplier can be calculated from (2) 
A full pass-through in the long run is reflected by θ=1.
The novelty that is introduced in this study is the differentiation between expected and unexpected monetary policy rate components, i.e. MP is replaced by MPE and MPU, as defined in equation (1). While the long-run relationship remains unchanged, the VAR model now takes the following specification 7 .
Note that as futures are unbiased forecasts of monetary policy rates, any unexpected monetary impulses can be interpreted as temporary and should as such be accounted for in the next months' futures rate. This impression is supported by the finding discussed above that MP and MPE are cointegrated and that MPU is I(0). As such, introducing lags of MPE or MPU would not be appropriate and would only lead to multicollinearity problems.
The model of equation (5) is however only valid if interest rates time series are found not to be integrated. However, interest rates are regularly found to be integrated of degree 1 8 . In such instances the VAR is estimated in first differences as 7 The optimal number of lags k* is selected via the AIC criteria where a maximum of 4 lags is allowed. 8 Standard unit root tests can be conducted as F or t-tests based on regressions on levels as well as first differences of the underlying interest rate series. Both regressions include next to lagged observations of the interest rate y in question also a trend variable T: ∆y t = a + b y t-1 + c ∆y t-1 + d T + ε t ∆ 2 y t = a + b ∆y t-1 + c ∆ 2 y t-1 + d T + ε t
The null hypothesis states that the series follow random walks. For the t-statistic, this corresponds to a null hypothesis of H 0 : b=0 and for the F-statistic to a null hypothesis of H 0 : b=d=0.
The previous specification again only holds if retail and monetary policy rates are not cointegrated. When interest rates are found to be I(1) and cointegrated, such that the cointegration regression
holds, the VAR has to be estimated in first differences and an error correction term (ECT) has to be included:
β E and β U represent the impact multipliers and ECT t-1 is the estimated error term u t-1 of the cointegration regression. The long-run multiplier can either be found as θ from the cointegration regression (7) or -when interest rates are not cointegrated -can be estimated based on the coefficients of equation (5) as
For the symmetric pass-through model, cointegration is based on the Durbin-Watson (DW), Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) testing procedures.
The DF tests are based on the estimated residuals of the cointegration regression in equation (6) as follows:
where the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient δ 0 provides an indication regarding the cointegration of the two series. The ADF test is obtained from the regression
where the optimal lag length c* is found based on the minimum Akaike information criterion (AIC) criteria with a maximum of four lags.
In the presence of asymmetric adjustment, models that account for these asymmetries are superior to the symmetric cointegration model and thus given preference. In particular, we consider five different specifications for asymmetric adjustment of interest rates. The first model we consider is the threshold autoregressive model (TAR 0 ) developed by Tong (1983) . The model makes a distinction whether the explained interest rate (retail lending or deposit rate in our case) is above or below its equilibrium level. Thus, the TAR 0 allows for asymmetric adjustment depending on the sign of equilibrium-deviation. For example, if the monetary policy rate decreases without an immediate adjustment in the lending rate, we obtain a positive realization of the error term u t . When in this case the autoregressive decay is faster than in the case of monetary policy rate increases, then the lending rate adjustment is faster downward than upward.
For this TAR 0 model, an appropriate test procedure is to set a Heaviside indicator I t for different states of u t-1 .
with the optimal lag length m* determined via the minimum AIC criteria for models with up to four lags. When cointegration is established, an F-test for equality of ρ 1 and ρ 2 indicates the presence of asymmetry.
The second model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR 0 in the sense that the threshold that was formerly implicitly set at zero is now allowed to deviate from that value. The rationale behind such a non-zero threshold is that one or both variables may only adjust to a dis-equilibrium once it exceeds a certain minimum deviation in one direction. For example, the lending rate will adjust fast only when out of an equilibrium situation the monetary policy rate drops in a way that the deviation from equilibrium 
Following Chan's (1993) , the optimal threshold a 0 * is found by searching over the mid-80% of the distribution of u t and selecting the model for which the residual sum of squares is minimized. Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above described F-tests. 9 For both, the TAR* and the following B-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR 0 specification is used.
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The third variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*). Such a model has often been applied to model interest rate cointegration where infrequent and discrete adjustments in the rates occur (e.g. Balke and Fomby 1997, Baum and Karasulu 1998) . For example, if deviations from equilibrium are small and will therefore not lead to an adjustment of the dependent interest rate, one may find no cointegration within a narrow band bordered by a 0 * and -a 0 * while outside this band cointegration and thus an error correction mechanism may be present. In the context of our study, such behaviour could be related Procedures for optimal lag length m* and optimal threshold a 0 * are corresponding to those of the TAR* and the F-tests for cointegration and asymmetry are applied to all three coefficients ρ j.
Finally, our fourth and fifth models represent momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models. Whereas in the TAR models the autoregressive decay always depends on the degree of deviation from equilibrium, one could also imagine situations where the adjustment speed depends on how fast the rates move away from or towards equilibrium.
Such M-TAR models have been successfully applied to the term structure of interest rates by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2000) . According to the latter authors, M-TAR adjustment can be especially useful when decision makers (in our case banks) are viewed as attempting to smooth out large changes in an interest rate. In methodological terms, the Heaviside indicator for an M-TAR model depends on the change in error correction term, ∆u t . Similar to the TAR 0 and TAR* specifications, M-TAR model can either be estimated with a threshold a 0 = 0 leading to the M-TAR 0 specification or be optimised at a 0 = a 0 * > 0 leading to the M-TAR* specification. 10 The
Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (13) is now defined as
Once the optimal specification of the long-run adjustment process has been found, a vector autoregressive model (VAR) is applied which provides insights into both the short-run as well as the long-run dynamics of the pass-through process.
In sum, we model selection process proceeds as follows: First, the interest rates included in this study are tested for unit roots. If interest rates are found to be I(0), we secondly estimate a standard pass-through model in levels. If however interest rates are found to be I(1), the long-run relationship between retail and market rates can be interpreted as a cointegration relationship and can thirdly be estimated to obtain the estimated residuals û t. Fourth, we estimate of all five TAR-type models and then, fifth, 15 test for cointegration for each TAR-type model. In case the cointegration hypothesis could not be rejected we, sixth, perform asymmetry test for equality of coefficients for each TAR-type model. Seventh, all steps from four to six are repeated with varying laglength to optimise AIC for each TAR-type, before, eighth, the optimal TAR-type model based on the minimum AIC across all model specifications is selected. Ninth, if however, we are not able to establish asymmetric cointegration based on the optimal TAR-type model, a symmetric model will be considered. A failure to establish cointegration here, will tenthly and finally redirect us to use the standard pass-through model as a last resort.
This model will be estimated in first differences as the interest rates have unit roots. After the optimum pass-through model is selected, multipliers are obtained for a variety of positive and negative interest rate shocks. Two peculiarities of the asymmetric models should be noted: First, as the speed of adjustment in asymmetric pass-through models depends on the model's estimated error, multipliers cannot simply be obtained by comparing two sets of forecasts -with and without changes in the explanatory variableat any point in time. As in all non-linear models, multipliers obtained this way apply only to the particular context. In order to provide "general" or "state-independent" multipliers, we calculate them based on an equilibrium situation. 11 Second, since the reaction of the retail rates depends on the size and direction of the shock, multipliers are also varying with the specific type of the shock.
4. Results
In order to select the optimal pass-through model, we start with the unit root testing and report the results in Table A1 of the appendix. As expected all bank rates have the I(1) or sometimes I(2) property and as such we can proceed with the cointegration testing of BR and MP. Table A2 reports results of both, the estimation of the long-run relationship of equation (7) and the symmetric cointegration tests. Overall, 40 out of 72 series (55.6%) are symmetrically cointegrated. However, if the true nature of the cointegration relationship is asymmetric, these tests might be misspecified. We therefore conduct asymmetric cointegration tests that reveal which pass-through model would be best specified for the country and interest rate under consideration. Based on the results reported in Table A3 of the appendix, of all 72 long-run relationships between the bank rate and monetary policy rate, 14 pairs of series (19%) are symmetrically cointegrated, 41 pairs of series (57%) are asymmetrically cointegrated, and 17 pairs of series (24%) show no cointegration. Note also that in all cases of asymmetric adjustment, a non-zero threshold is chosen as a best fit for the data. These findings are in line with Sander and
Kleimeier (2003) and highlight yet again the importance of asymmetric and threshold modelling in pass-through analyses.
Focussing now on the characteristics of the pass-through process, our long-run results are largely in line with the pass-through literature as long-run multipliers are often below 1 with the notable exemption of short-term lending to enterprises. Turning to impact multipliers and the short-run dynamics -again in line with the literature -we find considerable stickiness in bank rates. To illustrate that, in a first step, two sets of multipliers are calculated: One for a +1% shock in MPE, the other for a +1% shock in 17 MPU. The results are summarized in Figure 2 . Details on a country and rate level are listed in Table A4 of the appendix. Figure 2 illustrates how bank rates on average react to both, expected as well as unexpected monetary policy shocks and clearly reveals the incomplete and sluggish pass-through. Furthermore, for all rates except time deposits, the reaction to expected monetary policy impulses appears to be larger than to unexpected impulses as MPE multipliers are larger than the MPU multipliers. For practical purposes, it would also be interesting to find out how bank rates react to a simultaneous shock in both MPE and MPU. Simply shocking both rates by +1%, however, is not feasible. Looking at the series as displayed in Figure 1 , it is clear that the size and volatility of MPE and MPU are different with an average MPE of 3.61%
and MPU of 0.015% and standard deviations of 0.785% and 0.1076%, respectively. Thus, whereas the analysis in Figure 2 and Table A4 Finally, a comparison can be made between the joint shock to MPE and MPU as reported in Table 1 and a +1% shock to the realized monetary policy rate MP as reported in Table   2 . Here clearly recognizable differences in the size of the pass-through occur for most countries, rates, and time-horizons. Even if no clear direction can be identified, these results strongly support our case. Market expectations matter in the pass-through and disregarding them leads to an incorrect perception of the pass-through process.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
On a statistically more sophisticated base, our multipliers allow for testing of several interesting hypotheses. To do so, we constructed a panel consisting out of all positive and negative shock multipliers for both, expected and unexpected shocks, thus leading to a total of 260 observations. First, we test whether bank rates react really faster to expected than unexpected shock as suggested by Figure 2 . We therefore regress a dummy for expected monetary policy shocks on the impact and interim multipliers. In a second step of this exercise we also control for country and bank rate specifics by using the appropriate dummies. While in a first attempt we did not find statistically significant evidence for a special anticipated monetary policy effect, this result changes when using separate dummies for deposits and loans, thus pointing to differential effects in both markets 13 . The first set of regressions in Table 3 shows that the pass-through of expected market rate changes is significantly faster, but only for loans and not for deposits. To explore this issue further we have also made the same estimates for separated panels for positive and negative multipliers, which are reported in Table 4 . Anticipated rate increases, measured by a +1% shock, will statistically significant increase the passthrough in the loan markets up to 3 months. More specifically, banks will increase lending rates faster when they expect increases in market interest rates, but deposit rate will not be raised any faster. When looking into negative shocks some differences to the positive shock effects and -in this sense -some degree of asymmetry can be found. I.e.
the downward adjustment of lending rates for anticipated rate decreases is only significant for the impact and 1 month multipliers.
[Insert shocks lead to a higher degree of homogeneity in the Eurozone pass-through in loan, but not in deposit markets. However, the homogenizing effect is less pronounced for negative shocks, again pointing to the important role different national financial market structures.
The result therefore suggests that although a well-communicated monetary policy will be very helpful in creating a more uniform Eurozone pass-through, the importance of a competitive retail banking market must also be highlighted.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In sum, the point can be made that a well-anticipated, well-communicated monetary policy goes some way to speed-up and homogenize the pass-through process 21 and thus improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in the Eurozone. However, this would only constitute a complement to and not a substitute for competitive markets.
Conclusions
Our 260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260  260 260 Note: For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic in italics. multipliers For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient, the second row reports the t-statistic in italics. multipliers based on +1% shock multipliers based on -1% shock 871 -0.700 -0.944 -1.060 0.058 -0.432 -0.796 -0.630 0.263 -2.256 -0.397 -0.165 -0.452 -0.269 -0.771 -0.358 expected shock dummy * loan dummy -0. 
